• Small Group Not Representative of an Industry
• Professional Interest a Factor

Some of the firms we regard as "established" are only worth $600 million USD or less, while others newly made by foreign sovereign investment are $3 billion USD in capital without 1% of that in customer revenue. Parties named are also over $600 billion USD in liquidity organized for investment, while other properties have sold for $423 million USD to PEARL ABYSS (a legitimate company) geared for South Korea and Asian markets.

Putting this into perspective with companies like SPARKHOSTING LLC and other terminated firms used in the process, who are not-in-legal-use based on our last review, is important to point out that the capital assets of a firm are not a basis for denial of protection of criminal law from such fraud as we document in TEK SYSTEMS and other firms false claim of employment of our personnel at SHADOWDANCERS L.L.C. to defraud.

Where some competitor groups post $1 Trillion/yr in annual gross revenue, due to national monopoly contracts and 100,000 employees - it is easy to remember personnel on our team were retained over 80,000 layoffs as vital employees by similar firm - or to dismiss the value of all of those 80,000 people who lost their jobs as a result of breach of an email server, triggering a stock market meltdown and eventual merger of DEUTSCHE TELEKOM and SPRINT into T-MOBILE in the USA.

The important thing to understand, is that the abuse in this case affects other companies strategic position and partnerships up to $70 billion USD, and $40 billion in other transactions, from which the fraud has irreparably damaged strategic partnerships dating back to FEDORA 1.0 (operating system) and enjoined companies like IBM to the conflict as a result of limited provider-candidates for the technology, who may be competing for position of "best man" / "beta tester" roles with the smaller, more agile, and brutally more honest firm with seniority in Oklahoma - often with illicit claims to the effect of "never knowing we were here because we never screw up so bad anybody hears about it". In fact, the motto prior to the child abuse was "we were never here" - indicating our work left no footprint and sought no credit, the ideal form of 3rd party auditor and incident response team. Most of the people we audited didn't even know we existed, and our appearance and disappearance to audit their teams as a paid employer plant may have given rise to the false claims of employment by people we then referred for termination who got canned based on our assessment of their flagrant premeditated fraud activity at NORTEL. However, that's just a guess, since we got NO NEGATIVE REPORTS from the genuine client (and we checked, on first claim in this case - to verify).

So if I fired your ass, it's your boys fault - not my fault. Since no one at our office ever worked for TEK SYSTEMS, and we fired at least one TEK SYSTEMS team at Nortel, it sounds like libel to extort in competitor fraud in a second count by ROBERT HALF TECHNOLOGIES.

The Very Next Day

Harassing call at 9:21 am CDT.
Harassing call at 12:13 pm CDT.
Harassing call at 3:41 pm CDT.
Harassing call at 3:57 pm CDT.
Harassing call at 4:40 pm CDT. 

This is what we are seeing since extortion letters January 28th 2022.

All traffic appears to be hijacking clients CIDR for use in abuse from this server:
Arelion-level3-Dallas1.Level3.net (4.68.74.166)
Or from Compromised Edge in San Jose (CA, USA) as Alternate for Same Adversary (edge Level3 customer)

Effort to FAKE SOVIET / RUSSIAN profile to aggravate Ukraine Tension
sovintel.spb.ru IP used by Adversary in Amsterdam (Same data center)

Hostname "sovintel" on domain spb.ru run by Vimpel-Communications aka "Beeline.ru", a private ISP in Delaware and Russia known on the NYSE as VIP or by its subsidiary Golden Telecom GLDN, which has 50,000 subscribers in Ukraine. Small world, comrade. Come to Amsterdamn often?

We therefore show "nexus" with Amsterdamn and Copenhagen abuse from the January 28 2022 extortion letter served on the CITY OF ADA from ICELAND, and supporting registry in Reykjavik indicating host firms as 10.x.x.x subnet virtual services of atlas.cogentco.com - an NTT GROUP (Japan) company, and owner of NTT AMERICA (Ann Arbor Michigan) and PCH.NET (an NTT AFFILIATE NGO, San Jose CA - USA). Customers at these data centers may be compromised and used to exploit their REGISTERED IPv4 Address (CIDR) to carry out attacks by the host employee(s), and such reply to these SYN solicitations transmitted outside the physical host from the network edge falsified as a fake "attack" by targeted Oklahoma servers SYN-ACK (reply) to deceive the customers into a negative view of our assigned network, IPv4 name, and damage "trust" as reports from monitoring systems automatically and incorrectly record these volumetric flows as unsolicited incorrectly - defrauding customers of security services and harming the transport rating of well-known IP ADDRESSES of the Pontotoc County, State of Oklahoma firm(s) targeted by this abuse.

We first became aware of this bizarre scheme and threat October 31 2012, when uttered in open court before Judge Kilgore (PONTOTOC COUNTY DISTRICT COURT) by the Dallas Texas "network admin" who claimed his lost wages were $500/day ($62.50 USD/hr) while arrest and fines show it as $15/hr or less; to deceive local, State, and Federal investigators in impersonation of the victim, an Oklahoma resident with proven $60/hr 2000 annual hour earnings targeted in such fraud and taking for concealment of their child in 2001 August to extort.

A competent network engineer would recognize SYN-ACK traffic without SYN requests out, and classify such fraud as a "reflection attack", a flow triggered by forgery of thousands of requests source (SRC) address with a victim, to instigate ordinary and necessary replies to query (SYN-ACK) which the perpetrator and defective security software would misclassify as a malicious flow and report the host/IP being targeted by such false and non-business illicit traffic in volume and programed speed exceeding 1 packet per 3 seconds and 20 per minute for 1200 per hour not associated with an ESTABLISHED and ASSURED Connection (one where both machines verify they made such request, prior sending unregistered NEW requests or malformed packets). These conditions cannot occur accidentally, and require malice of forethought to craft and transmit and sustain and evade normal blocks created by firewalls systematically and procedurally. Response data may also give information on the target machine, uptime, maintenance, and obstruct other legitimate traffic, slow response, and consume network and compute resources to impair ordinary service in a procedural and premeditated commercial manner to harm merchantability and fitness of purpose by misuse of computer systems, including voice and telephone services over packet-switched networks required in commerce and protected utility services of INTERSTATE COMMERCE.

Suggestion in open court to imply such cause as a partial defense for an 8 million ICMP flood over 72 hours, which the perpetrator also suggested falsely was "accidental" (not possible without explicit misuse of software and additional instructions in detail), sustain the alleged 18 U.S. §1341 complaint (fraud) in concealment and withholding of ORDERED POSSESSION of a child to extort associated with November 14 2021 and March 3 2022 and April 4, 8, 16th 2022 and May 13th 2022 extortion supporting the OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF TEXAS demand for money in violation of Federal TITLE IV exclusive authority and 45 CFR rule, fraud over $10128 USD in U.S. Mail illicit demand, alleged 21 O.S. 21-1304 "Letters Threatening" in form and date of form also obsolete and prohibited pro forma.

Rotation of IP using client names to route attacks in this format appear to send 60,000 packets before changing IPv4 source/CIDR to evade bans, in a malicious software designed to perform this fraud, not related to genuine "penetration testing" or other moderate query activity, as shown fw_sample_20220603_highrateban.txt. This is about 9375 40-byte SYN packets (requests) per IP, systematically, and to random ports lacking a service to solicit a request to the forged-source target, over 4 years, up to 24,000 per hour at times average. This is sufficient mens rea to prosecute by the District Attorney or for employers to fire an employee for fraud on prima facie engaged in such behavior against an Internet server without written consent. Testing allows use of such protocols up to 100 requests/day in limited circumstances and ordinary conditions, and from fixed or stable IPv4 or IPv6 ADDRESS sources only - subject blocking. Evasion indicates criminal mens rea and misuse of computer networks to impair the merchantabiilty and fitness of purpose in INTERSTATE COMMERCE of the targeted commercial entity leased property, across State and Federal borders, and fraud in false report so created and crafted to deceive security rating services employed by consumers and commercial peers whose ranking of trust can disable email, Domain Name Services, and other vital COMMERCIAL SERVICES of INTERSTATE COMMERCE.